AS28715 Leads Tor Operators in RPKI/ROA Adoption

POSTED IN bgp

As discussed in our post BGP Maintenance and Security we had made some changes to our routing setup so as to better secue our Tor Exits.

Today Nusenu published a blog post detailing the extent of ROA/RPKI in the Tor Relay ecosystem; https://medium.com/@nusenu/how-vulnerable-is-the-tor-network-to-bgp-hijacking-attacks-56d3b2ebfd92

Despite only running 6 Exit relays (~1Gbit/s worth mind you!) Brass Horn Communications made it into the list of “biggest RPKI ROA adopters on the Tor network”;

+------------------------------+------+--------+
| as_name                      | CWfr | relays |
+------------------------------+------+--------+
| Hetzner Online GmbH          | 7.02 |    284 |
| Online S.a.s.                | 5.16 |    113 |
| myLoc managed IT AG          | 2.02 |     41 |
| netcup GmbH                  | 1.73 |     50 |
| NForce Entertainment B.V.    | 1.50 |     25 |
| Voxility S.R.L.              | 1.06 |     14 |
| SOFTplus Entwicklungen GmbH  | 0.81 |     15 |
| ISPpro Internet KG           | 0.62 |     21 |
| I.C.S. Trabia-Network S.R.L. | 0.61 |     45 |
| SWITCH                       | 0.48 |      9 |
| Telenor Norge AS             | 0.39 |     28 |
| Joshua Peter McQuistan       | 0.37 |      5 |
| 1&1 Internet SE              | 0.34 |      8 |
| Brass Horn Communications    | 0.33 |      6 |
| True B.V.                    | 0.30 |      1 |
| Deutsche Telekom AG          | 0.29 |    152 |
+------------------------------+------+--------+